

no future in the debate over the supposed visit of the historian to Egypt. Indeed the Euergides Painter's cup can only be interpreted as a sanctuary dedication by a Herodotus, and should not be used as evidence for a visit of the Herodotus to Egypt, however tempting it may be to use it as such.

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**Where three roads meet:
a neglected detail in the *Oedipus Tyrannus****

'There is surely more than geography involved in the extraordinary stress laid in the play on the importance of the branching road.' So writes the latest editor of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, R. D. Dawe, who proceeds to mention the 'sexual significance . . . (the junction of the human trunk and legs)' which 'people tell us' is to be discerned behind the references to the cross-roads where Oedipus met and killed his father.¹ Dawe finds it difficult to make up his mind whether quasi-Freudian symbolism is properly to be attributed to Sophocles, and in adopting an equivocal position he cites only one further factor, that 'the imagery of cross-roads is common enough representing a point where a crucial decision has to be made'.

It is disappointing that the matter should be left there, and it is with some surprise that one turns to earlier commentators and critics only to find exiguous illumination on this detail of the play and the myth. In particular, it seems not usually to be thought pertinent to refer to the well-attested religious significance of branching roads in ancient Greece (as in many other cultures). Yet it is obvious that the myth of Oedipus's parricide did not require that father and son should have met and clashed at the forking of a road; their paths could have been imagined to converge in many different circumstances.² But without the *tríodos* a factor of important potential to a tragedian's treatment of the legend would have been lost, and Sophocles had good reason for retaining an element which had certainly played a part in the Aeschylean version, even if, as we shall see, he altered the emphasis given to it by his predecessor. In this note I wish to argue that the handling of the cross-roads in the *OT* carries a charge of

blended irony and religious suggestiveness. Before examining this aspect of the play, however, it will be helpful to glance at some other passages in Greek literature which show how the motif of a *tríodos* could be exploited for its religious associations.

About the general character of these associations little needs to be said here. It will be readily recalled that cross-roads were connected in particular with the chthonic deity, Hekate, but also with Persephone, who like Hekate could be called *ἑνοδία θεός*; and that, because of these connections, such places were the location of various ritual practices, especially of a cathartic or apotropaic kind.³ This background explains why in most of the references to cross-roads in classical literature a religious point can be traced. (Plato *Laws* 799c-d provides a rare instance where the configuration of roads stands purely for a difficult and decisive choice.) Even at Theognis 911,

ἐν τρίοδῳ δ' ἔστηκεν δὺ' εἰσι τὸ πρόσθεν ὁδοὶ μοι

the choice between the forks of the road has darker overtones. The dilemma between styles of life is tied up with the question of one's apportioned *αἴσα* (907) and with the difficulty of foreseeing one's *βίτου τέλος* (905). The image is therefore not purely formal; it has the resonance of symbolising a choice which the individual may not fully grasp, a choice which may involve factors beyond his control and a destiny he cannot anticipate. The same is true of Xen. *Mem.* ii 1.21 ff., where, in Prodicus's allegory, Virtue and Vice appear to the adolescent Heracles as he sits at a forking road pondering on the choice between ways of life.⁴ The English dead metaphor here notionally corresponds, of course, but its triteness gives no clue to the special force of the image in Greek.

The alignment of roads and destinies is more explicitly utilised by Plato in the myth of the *Gorgias*. Here Socrates pictures the Judges of the Underworld conducting their tribunal in a meadow, 'at the cross-roads which fork one way to the isles of the blest and the other to Tartarus' (524a 2-4). The parting of the ways not only represents the decisiveness of final judgement, but reproduces the distinction between the lives that the souls have chosen to live. If we combine this image with a related passage from the myth of the *Phaedo*, we can say that the cross-roads in Hades are the fulfilment of the choices previously made by the souls at all the 'forkings and crossings of roads' which they encounter on their way to Hades (*Phaedo* 108a 4). And we can observe that in this same passage of the *Phaedo* Plato attests the ubiquity of religious rituals at cross-roads in his time, for

* I am very grateful to Mrs P. E. Easterling, Mr E. W. Whittle and Dr Emily Kearns for their helpful comments on drafts of this note.

¹ Sophocles: *Oedipus Rex* (Cambridge 1982) 3. I am not sure who Dawe's 'people' are. There seems to be no comment on this detail of the Oedipus saga in any of Freud's discussions, but for a psychoanalytical interpretation see D. Van der Sterren, *Oedipe: une étude psychanalytique* (French transl., Paris 1974) 71-8. According to C. G. Jung, *Symbols of transformation* (Engl. transl., London 1956) 371, cross-roads are symbolic of the mother and for this belief see also T. Gould, *Oedipus the King* (New Jersey 1970) 156 (cf. 92-3 for a reference to Hekate).

² B. Knox, in *Sophocle* ed. J. de Romilly (*Fond. Hardt* XXIX, [1983]) 182, denies that the three roads are of much significance, and observes that the killing could have occurred 'just as well on one road'; but he misses the implication of this last remark. Knox had earlier, in *Oedipus at Thebes* (London 1957) 91, referred without elucidation to the 'terrible significance' of the *tríodos*. Lamer, *RE* XII 494, is both pedantic and, in view of *OT* 1398 ff., wrong to suggest that the parricide occurs only in the vicinity of the cross-roads. C. Segal, *Tragedy and civilisation* (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1981) 221-2 stresses the importance of the bestial, unnatural atmosphere of the place and the encounter (and cf. 368 f. on roads in the *OC*).

³ On Greek cross-roads see T. Hopfner, *RE* VIIa 161-6, and for comparative evidence the article by J. A. MacCulloch in the *Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics*, ed. J. Hastings (Edinburgh 1908-26) vol. 4, 330 ff. For the link with Hekate (found in Sophocles himself in *fr.* 535 Radt and Pearson=492 N², with which cf. *Ar. fr.* 515 PCG=500-01 Kock) see e.g. Heckenbach, *RE* VII s.v. 'Hekate', esp. 2775, and T. Kraus, *Hekate* (Heidelberg 1960). On Hekate and Persephone: *Soph. Ant.* 1199 and *Eur. Ion* 1048, with N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 155-7. For various references to religion at cross-roads see *Eur. Supp.* 1212, *Ar. Pl.* 594-7, *fr.* 209 PCG=204 Kock, *Plato Phaedo* 108a 5, *Leg.* xi 933b 3, *Thphr. Char.* xvi 5, 14, *Callim. Hymn* 6.114, and cf. R. Parker, *Miasma* (Oxford 1983) 30 f.

⁴ Cf. the story about Socrates at *Cic. Div.* i 54.123, where the symbol of a *tríodos* is combined with Socrates' divine voice.

Socrates infers the nether τρίοδοι 'from the sacrifices and customs that take place at such places on earth' (ἀπὸ τῶν θυσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε, α 5). As in other details of his eschatological myths, Plato borrows traditional religious practices and ideas for his own purposes:⁵ without losing their religious aura, which Plato evidently values, they are employed to lend vivid emphasis to his belief in the central importance of a soul's choice of life, a choice that leads eventually to the chthonic Judges' confirmation of the moral direction of each soul's journey, which now, consequently, acquires the status of a destiny. We have here an interesting but complex contrast to the significance which, I shall shortly suggest, is to be found in the cross-roads of Oedipus's story.

One further, intriguing Platonic passage should be cited. In Book ix of the *Laws* (873 a–b) it is prescribed that in the new State the penalty for deliberate killing of one's kin will be death, after which the corpse of the killer should be taken to a designated τρίοδος and cast there naked, to be stoned about the head by officers of the State, and then thrown unburied beyond the boundaries. There is evidence that piles of stones were sometimes located at cross-roads as primitive religious tokens, but I see no way of knowing whether Plato means to allude to these here.⁶ Nor can we tell whether the proposed procedure reflects existing legislation or traditional practice, if either.⁷ Yet what is evident about the treatment of parricides and others in this passage of the *Laws* is that it combines a judicial penalty with a ritual expiation of pollution, and it is this second element which receives the most attention. In the compound view of a killing as both a crime and a polluting act, Plato's legislation certainly follows Attic law and thinking; but what directly bears on my present argument is his choice of cross-roads as the appropriate setting for the expiatory ritual. Here the apotropaic functions of Hekate are presumably pertinent.⁸ It is also even conceivable, I think, that Plato is alluding to the archetypal parricide Oedipus, whom he had referred to as a morally culpable agent in the previous book of the *Laws*, at 838c. Beyond this there is little point in speculating, but it remains suggestive that Plato should have associated the horror of parricide and kindred deeds with the strength of religious power thought to be immanent at cross-roads. I shall shortly suggest that Sophocles exploits the same conjunction in the *OT*, though to rather different effect.

Some of the passages from Plato cited above demonstrate forcefully the way in which the use of a forking road as a metaphor for decisive choice can

coalesce with the dark associations of τρίοδοι to produce a potent and complex symbol. Although we have lost the context of the lines, the fragment of Aeschylus's *Laius* in which the location of Oedipus's encounter with his father is mentioned suggests a similarly intricate intention. The fragment is as follows:

ἐπῆμην τῆς ὁδοῦ τροχῆλατον
σχιστῆς κελεύθου τρίοδον, ἔνθα συμβολὰς
τριῶν κελεύθων Ποτνιαδῶν ἡμείβομεν.⁹

These lines appear to be spoken by a surviving member of Laius's entourage, and presumably identify the point at which the Theban party, travelling from Thebes to Plataea, or in the return direction, reached the point where the road forked to Potniae. This town was named after αἱ Πότνιαι, Demeter and Kore,¹⁰ with whom Hekate, as we have seen, was connected. Oedipus's parricide occurred then at cross-roads which looked in one direction towards a town associated with deities of death, and there is likely to have been significance in this detail for the Aeschylean treatment of Oedipus's fate.

This point was noted by Jebb in his introduction to the *OT*, but he went on to suggest that Sophocles had deliberately diverged from his predecessor's account, shifting the scene of the cross-roads 'from the control of the dark Avenging Powers to a region within the influence of that Delphian god . . .'.¹¹ There is something in this suggestion, and the powers of death certainly have little *explicit* part in the *OT*. But Jebb overlooks the significance of the meeting place itself, independently of a reference to Potniae, and it is this significance, I wish to argue, which Sophocles follows Aeschylus in exploiting.

Bearing in mind both the general religious and symbolic implications of cross-roads, and their specific occurrence in Aeschylus's treatment of the Theban legend, we can turn now to examine their role in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* itself. We notice at once that the detail of the τρίοδος is given pointed dramatic emphasis at its first mention in the play (716), despite the apparent casualness with which Jocasta includes it in her attempt to dispel Oedipus's lingering concern with Teiresias's accusations and predictions. The circumstantial detail can be felt to be doubly disturbing: firstly, in that it is intrinsically ominous that Laius should have been killed at such a spot, connected with Hekate, a goddess of death; secondly, because it is precisely this point in Jocasta's narrative which startles Oedipus and arouses further agitation in him, as we learn in reading at 726–8, but as would be immediately clear in performance at 716 itself, since Oedipus's reaction, described by him in strong emotional terms, would be marked by a movement or gesture. That the ominous dimension of death at cross-roads goes unnoticed by Jocasta is consistent with her will to convince herself of the accidental nature of the event, and to convince Oedipus of the futility of oracles. But this only heightens the irony of Jocasta's delusions; we learn not to trust her scepticism. The location of Laius's death is indeed striking, a landmark which Oedipus would have good

⁵ For a connection with Orphic beliefs see W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek religion*² (London 1952) 176, though Guthrie misses the point about cross-roads on earth. Plato may also here be using Pythagorean symbolism of the forking road, for which see F. Cumont, *Lux Perpetua* (Paris 1949) 278 ff.

⁶ Cf. Thphr. *Char.* xvi 5, Paus. x 5.2.

⁷ R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The administration of justice from Homer to Aristotle* ii (Chicago 1938) 277 f., argue that the passage reflects archaic practice. E. R. Dodds, *The ancient concept of progress* (Oxford 1973) 72 refers indefinitely to 'actual Greek practice'.

⁸ Plato seems nowhere to mention Hekate by name, though *Leg.* 914b 4 is surely a reference to her, and she must be included in a passage such as *Leg.* 854b 7.

⁹ *Fr.* 172 Mette = 173 N².

¹⁰ Cf. *Soph.* *OC* 1050 and Richardson (n. 3) 161–2.

¹¹ *Sophocles: Oedipus Tyrannus* (Cambridge 1893) xviii–xix, followed by e.g. F. Letters, *The Life and Work of Sophocles* (London 1953) 205.

reason to remember: although Creon had not mentioned it earlier (*cf.* 114 f.), it is, so Jocasta herself reveals, a fact which continues to be talked of by the Thebans (731).

When Oedipus is persuaded by Jocasta to give explicit voice to his anxiety, he offers the full account of his early disquieting experience in Corinth, his journey to consult the oracle at Delphi, and his encounter on the road after his decision not to return to Corinth. Although the location of the fateful meeting with Laius is, as Dawe says, more than a matter of 'mere geography', it is as well to be clear in the first place about the factual details of the scene.¹² Dawe in his note on line 734 supposes that 'Laius was killed on his way back from Delphi', but this must be incorrect, since Oedipus and Laius *meet* on the road and are about to pass one another when violence breaks out (800 ff.).¹³ It is quite clear that Oedipus is travelling along the road from Delphi; having received a chilling response from the oracle, he has set off with the intention of not returning to Corinth. Laius, then, is on his way *to* Delphi, a destination he never reaches, travelling as a θεωρός to consult the oracle (114).

Out of this conjunction of details a forceful irony emerges, centring on the cross-roads. In addition to its latent religious significance, the location symbolises the converging destinies of father and son; their paths coincide at a juncture which is the crisis and turning-point of their journeys and their lives. Laius, who we may be expected to suppose is travelling to consult the oracle further about his exposed son, does not get as far as Apollo's shrine, yet he receives in advance, if the supposition is right, the terrible answer to his enquiry.¹⁴ In the same moment and the same act Oedipus fulfils part of the very oracle which he has just received but from whose outcome his journey itself is now intended to carry him away. After killing Laius, the choice of direction which he now deludedly makes, at these same crucial cross-roads, takes him along the road to Thebes and precisely, yet again ironically, towards the further fulfilment of the oracle. If cross-roads represent and symbolise choices, it is consummately ironic that the illusion of Oedipus's determination to choose his future should be expressed in the events which occur at such a spot: for not only does Oedipus here take the road which leads towards the home from which he believes himself to be fleeing, but it is also at a crossing suitable for apotropaic rites that he makes his own apotropaic act of turning further away from Corinth, only moments after committing the very parricide he intends to avert.

If the religious implications of what happens at the τρίοδος are left unexpressed in Oedipus's account to Jocasta, Sophocles reserves for the climax of the drama a note of more overtly menacing timbre. When the blinded Oedipus forces himself in the last scene of the tragedy to piece together the newly discovered pattern of his life, he does so, in the pained vision of his

memory, through a series of images of the places where his destiny was acted out: first Cithaeron, which the Chorus had earlier called Oedipus's nurse and mother (1090–92), and which the King himself now apostrophises as if it were the personal recipient of the exposed child (1391–3); then Corinth and the palace which he had long regarded as his father's (1394–6); finally, and most disturbingly, the juncture of three roads at which he met and killed Laius (1398–1403). As with Cithaeron and Corinth, Oedipus addresses the place personally: this is no mere rhetorical figure, but an expression of Oedipus's sense that his life has been lived amid latent forces and in places which were actively implicated in shaping his destiny.¹⁵ The final reference to the site of Oedipus's one and only encounter with his father is the most specific and evocative of all:

ὦ τρεῖς κέλευθοι καὶ κεκρυμμένη νάπη
δρυμός τε καὶ στενωπός ἐν τριπλαίῃς ὁδοῖς. . .

The details in these lines go beyond topographical description and provide an emotive image of the place. κεκρυμμένη νάπη suggests both the hollow of the land and also thick wooded cover; the cross-roads become visually as well as religiously dark, and this impression is strengthened by δρυμός and στενωπός. A δρυμός represents dense woodland (compare the Homeric phrase διὰ δρυμὰ πυκνὰ καὶ ὕλην), and στενωπός emphasises how the tracks tightly converge. Such a place might well be thought to provide opportunities for the sort of λησταί who had been suspected of Laius's murder (122 ff., 715 f., 842); and Oedipus's description of the place helps us to visualise why Laius's herald had tried to get the stranger off the road to allow the passage of the King's carriage (804 f.). But there is more to the lines than this. The word νάπη (or νάπος) is one which can easily carry religious associations: it can be used of sites such as Delphi and Olympia, and it is applied by Sophocles himself to the grove of the Eumenides at Colonus.¹⁶ Although such associations are not inevitable, they are, I suggest, in place here, particularly in view of the connotations of τρίοδοι. The image of the κεκρυμμένη νάπη both intensifies the significance of the cross-roads and adds its own suggestiveness of a religious grove. In so far as Oedipus's memory of the place intimates the sense of its being like a grove, the texture of the play's irony is complicated yet further, since such groves were marked out as specially pure enclosures.

But we do not need to rest content with general inference of this sort, for Oedipus's own remarkable words in 1400–01 are explicitly religious: the triple roads, he says, 'drank the blood of my very own father from my very own hands', τοῦμόν αἷμα τῶν ἐμῶν χειρῶν ἀπο/ἐπίετε πατρός (both possessives are emphatic). While this notion that the place drank Laius's blood hovers in the blurred area between potent metaphor and a frenzied vision of actuality, the force of the image is unmistakable.¹⁷ The drinking of blood appears first in

¹² On the topography see C. Robert, *Oidipus i* (Berlin 1915) 83 ff.

¹³ ξυναντιόζειν (804), like συναντῶν and -εσθαι, clearly implies an encounter from different directions: *cf.* συναντόμενος of Oedipus at Pind. *O.* 2.39. Dawe (n. 1) on line 114 is also wrong to assert that Oedipus and Laius travelled to Delphi 'at the same time': Sophocles' version is not in this respect parallel to Euripides' at *Phoen.* 32–45.

¹⁴ Laius's purpose, if correctly supplied, would be the same as at Eur. *Phoen.* 35–7 (but *cf.* n. 13).

¹⁵ On the relation of these places to the 'stage geography' of the *OT* see O. Taplin in *Sophocle* (n. 2) 166–74.

¹⁶ *Cf.* Pind. *P.* 5.38, 6.9, and Soph. *OC* 157. The many νάπει of Cithaeron (*OT* 1026) would be suitable for shrines: see V. Scully, *The earth, the temple and the gods*² (New Haven and London 1979) 29, for Boeotian shrines of Heracles.

¹⁷ LSJ s.v. 'πίνω' III lists *OT* 1401, with Aesch. *Sept.* 737 and 821,

Greek literature in connection with the αἵμακουρία to Patroclus's soul in *Iliad* xxiii, and with the ghosts in *Odyssey* xi.¹⁸ Thereafter it appears particularly in association with the Erinyes.¹⁹ It is arguable that to the audience of tragedy Oedipus's apostrophe of the cross-roads would have suggested that they were being treated as symbolic Erinyes, for it is they whom we would expect to witness the parricide, as at Pind. O. 2.41.²⁰ The language is at any rate sufficient to indicate that in Oedipus's own memory the killing of Laius has taken on the status of an act committed at a place which embodied the presence of chthonic forces. In thus dramatising the fallen King's sense of the tragic event, Sophocles is drawing out, in a particularly intense form, the significance which had been implicit in the references to the τρίοδος earlier in the play.

In directing attention to the forking road in the *OT*, it is not my purpose to pretend that this detail carries a simple, determinate religious meaning. But to concede this much does not entail, where we are dealing with so ironic and subtle a text, the rejection of *any* religious interpretation of this element in the story. Only those who regard Sophocles as more of a theologian than a dramatist will expect him to deal consistently in doctrinal assertion or conclusive demonstration of divine agency. In fact, much that is relevant to the understanding of religion in the surviving plays comes in the form of deliberately obscure, riddling or shifting hints and glimpses of a complex divine involvement in the events of the heroic world.²¹ Religious *suggestiveness*, not necessarily resolvable into certain and stable comprehension, is a major means of dramatic significance in Sophocles. It is in these terms that the cross-roads in the *OT* need to be viewed, and that is why I have made some attempt to indicate how Sophocles could exploit the associations which this detail had for his audience.

That specific references to Furies, a family curse and kindred matters have largely been eliminated from the *OT* is not in doubt.²² This divergence from Aeschylean and Pindaric precedent may well be the negative

counterpart of an attempt to increase the Apollonian dimension of the story. But Sophocles' handling of the myth, even where Apollo is concerned, is characteristically ironic and oblique. Does Apollo merely foresee or does he also bring about? Is Apollo the only divine force behind Oedipus's sufferings, or are there others? At more than one point there is ambiguity. It is consistent with this that Sophocles, while reducing the ostensible involvement of chthonic powers in the myth, has not removed all traces of them. The occurrence of Oedipus's parricide at a τρίοδος sacred to a dangerous deity, and one perhaps related to Apollo himself,²³ leaves open the possibility that forces other than the god of Delphi might be discerned behind Laius's and Oedipus's destinies. Nor is it enough to treat the branching road as a purely traditional part of the myth: however old it may have been, Sophocles' use of it—marking it with a moment of chilling emphasis in the scene with Jocasta, and allowing it to recur with intensified significance in the great rhesis of the blinded Oedipus—should leave us in no doubt that he meant his audience to notice it, and ponder it, afresh.

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²³ On Hekate's relation to Apollo and Artemis (for Artemis and cross-roads cf. Plut. *Mor.* 170b) see Heckenbach (n. 3) 2769–71, Kraus (n. 3) 11–23. It would be wrong to press too hard the Olympian-chthonic distinction (*locus classicus* Isoc. 5.117) between deities such as Apollo and Hekate: see A. D. Nock, *Essays on religion and the ancient world* ii (Oxford 1972) 591–2, 599–601.

Prometheus Desmotes 354

Prometheus, having lamented the burden of his brother Atlas, speaks of earthborn Typhos and his punishment by Zeus. The text and apparatus of lines 351 to 357 are given in Sir Denys Page's edition thus:¹

τὸν γηγενῆ τε Κιλικίων οἰκῆτορα
 ἀντρῶν ἰδῶν ὠικτιρα, δάιον τέρας,
 ἕκατογκάρανον πρὸς βίαν χειρούμενον,
 Τυφῶνα θυῶρον· ἴπᾱσιν ὄσῃ ἀντέτθη θεοῖς
 μερδναῖσι γαμφηλαῖσι κυρίζων φόβον, 355
 ἔξ ὀμμάτων δ' ἤστραπτε γοργωπὸν κέλας,
 ὡς τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδ' ἐκπέτρων βίαι.

353 ἕκατογκάρανον Blomfield: ἕκατοντακάρηνον vel -κάρηνον fere codd. 354 πᾱσιν ὄσ M1ΔBCHWDLcLhPGTr: ὄσ πᾱσιν XHaVNNcOYYaKQF; ὄστις (deleto πᾱσιν tamquam gloss.) Gaisford, θεός ὄσ (deleto πᾱσιν) Headlam 355 γαμφηλαῖσι MΔIO^{4c}W (ut vid.)KQG: -λήσι rell. φόβον M1ΔBH^{4c}O^{2pc} et sscr. XWF: φόνον I^{sscr} rell. 357 ἐκπέτραι θέλων D, ἐκπέτραι etiam KQ^{1sscr}, θέλων Q^{2yp}, ἐκπέτραι θέλων βίαι W

Page did not believe that the correct emendation of line 354 had been found. The variety of conjectures, some of them wild, can be seen in Dawe's collection.² In emending the unmetrical πᾱσιν ὄσ scholars have not agreed where the corruption lies. Gaisford's ὄστις fails to explain the presence of πᾱσιν, and it was rejected by G. Hermann because it is syntactically awkward: . . . *ne recte quidem dictum est ὄστις, quod pronomen quum non sit definitivus, quam vim habet ὄσ, sed declarantis, referendum id*

Eum. 979 (for 980, and cf. *Cho.* 66, 400–02) alongside examples of the earth 'drinking' rain etc.: but the Aeschylean passages, like the Sophoclean, all involve killings between either kin or fellow citizens, and the language involved correspondingly carries the terrible implications of such spilt blood.

¹⁸ *Il.* xxiii 29–34, *Od.* xi 36 ff., 95 ff. For αἵμακουρία cf. Pind. O. 1.90.

¹⁹ Aesch. *Agam.* 1188 f., *Cho.* 577 f., *Eum.* 264–6, *Soph. Aj.* 843 f., *Trach.* 1054–6, fr. 743. At Hesiod *Theog.* 183 ff. the Erinyes are born from the blood of Uranos, caught by the Earth. For the drinking of blood by the dead cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 97, 164, *Soph. El.* 1417–21, *OC* 621–3 (or Oedipus as a Fury? cf. *Electra* at *El.* 784–6), *Eur. Hec.* 392 f., 534 ff. Hekate too is a drinker of blood, not surprisingly: Heckenbach (n. 3) 2776.

²⁰ For Erinyes and crimes against parents see, in addition to the *Oresteia*, *Hom. Il.* ix 453 f., 569–72, *Od.* ii 134–6. Erinyes are also relevant to Oedipus's incest: cf. *Hom. Od.* xi 280. A. L. Brown, *CQ* xxxiv (1984) 280, argues that Erinyes play no part in the *OT*, but he deals only with the explicit.

²¹ Some obvious instances are Athena's uncertain involvement in Ajax's suicide (esp. *Aj.* 749–55); the background of the family curse in *Antigone*; the relation between the oracles and the end of *Trachiniai*; and the obscurities surrounding Helenus's oracle in *Philoctetes*.

²² See R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: an interpretation* (Cambridge 1980) 205 f., and for some considerations on the other side H. Lloyd-Jones, *The justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 121–3.

¹ Aeschylus O.C.T. (Oxford 1972) 302.

² *Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus* (Leiden 1965) 16.